---
title: "Azure Front Door DRS 2.1 flags legitimate multipart uploads (General-200002/200003)"
url: "https://www.dariuszparys.com/notes/azure-front-door-drs-2-1-flags-multipart-uploads"
author: "Dariusz Parys"
published: 2026-11-13T00:00:00.000Z
description: "Most legitimate browser multipart uploads reach the anomaly threshold of Azure Front Door's Default Rule Set 2.1 through two General rules, and field exclusions do not cover them."
---

# Azure Front Door DRS 2.1 flags legitimate multipart uploads (General-200002/200003)

## Context

Azure Front Door Premium WAF with `Microsoft_DefaultRuleSet` 2.1. Before switching the managed rules from `Log` to `Block`, check what real traffic they would stop. A WAF policy can run in `Prevention` mode with the managed rule set action on `Log` (`ruleSetAction: 'Log'`). In that setup, custom rules such as rate limits block, while the managed rules only log.

Exclusions on `RequestBodyPostArgNames` for the upload field `file` were already in place for the SQLI, XSS and PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT groups.

## Insight

- **Uploads trip the General rules.** Most legitimate browser multipart uploads match `General-200002` (`ParseBodyError`) and `General-200003` (strict multipart validation). Each scores 5, so together they reach the anomaly threshold `BLOCKING-EVALUATION-949110`. Once the rule set action is `Block`, these uploads are blocked. ID photos tripped the rules almost every time, documents about half the time.
- **The usual exclusions don't help.** A field exclusion covers the field _value_ for the listed rule groups, not body parsing, so it does **not** cover the General rules.
- **Exclusions don't cover the multipart file name either.** An apostrophe in a file name trips `920120`/`920121` on `MultipartFileName:file`.
- **JSON inside a multipart field trips SQLI.** Ordinary values set it off, for example a company name containing `&`.
- **A common test value counts as an attack.** `SQLI-942220` matches the exact value `0000012345`, so testers who type it are flagged.
- **Everything else was scanners.** The rest of the traffic that would have been blocked was scanner probes (`/.env`, `/.git/config`, `/.aws/credentials`, injection on login paths), which the app already answered harmlessly.
- **Manual tests in log-only mode prove nothing about `Block` mode.** A request that "passed the WAF" may still have reached 949110. Read the log.

**Decision:** keep the managed rules on `Log` and rely on the rate-limit custom rules in `Prevention` mode.

**To make `Block` usable:**

- Count the upload requests that reach 949110 (query below).
- Add narrow overrides for 200002/200003 on the upload paths only.
- Decide how to handle special characters in file names.
- Consider a 403 block response. `customBlockResponseStatusCode` is policy-wide, so with the rate-limit status a blocked upload shows up as a confusing 429.

## Query: which requests would be blocked

Run against the Log Analytics workspace that receives the Front Door diagnostics. It joins the WAF log to the access log on `trackingReference_s`:

```kusto
let waf = AzureDiagnostics
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d) and Category == "FrontDoorWebApplicationFirewallLog";
let flagged = waf | where ruleName_s has "949110" | distinct trackingReference_s;
AzureDiagnostics
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d) and Category == "FrontDoorAccessLog"
| where httpMethod_s in ("POST","PUT")
| extend path = tostring(parse_url(requestUri_s).Path)
// optional: only your upload routes
// | where path matches regex @'/(documents|upload)$'
| extend path = replace_regex(path, @'[0-9a-fA-F-]{36}', '{id}')   // group routes that differ only by ID
| extend f = trackingReference_s in (flagged)
| summarize total=count(), wouldBlock=countif(f), ok2xx=countif(f and httpStatusCode_s startswith "2")
    by httpMethod_s, path
| where wouldBlock > 0 | order by wouldBlock desc
```

To see which rules scored a request and what they matched, group `FrontDoorWebApplicationFirewallLog` by `ruleName_s` and `details_matches_s` for the upload paths.
